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1. INTRODUCTION
The United States is waging a war on terrorism. The weapon
is the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 ("ILSA" or
"Sanctions Act"),' the primary target of which is neither terror-
ism nor its sponsors. Congress, seeking constriction of the petro-
leum industries of Iran and Libya, intends to compel U.S. trading
partners to comply with the enforcement mechanisms of U.S.
foreign policy. The unfortunate reality of ILSA simply is that it
unilaterally allocates the burden of paying for the enforcement of
U.S. foreign policy by means of a boycott leveled against foreign
countries and companies otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of the
United States.
Jurisdiction is central to evaluating the efficacy of ILSA.
ILSA, not surprisingly, incited disapprobation within the interna-
tional community. Criticism of Congress and its dubious prog-
eny universally focused on the extraterritoriality of the Sanctions
1 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1997)). Also referred to as the D'Amato Act after
proponent Senator Alfonse D'Amato, R-New York, ILSA received presidential
approval on August 5, 1996. See Kees Jan Kuilwijk, Restrictions Hit Traders,
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 10, 1996, at 19.
2 See, e.g., Bruce W. Nelan, Taking on the World, TIME, Aug. 26, 1996, at 26
(citing Canada, Mexico, and the European Union ("EU") as critical of the U.S.
legislation imposing boycotts). Representatives from member states of the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") reproached the United States
for threatening sovereignty and restricting trade with the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 ("Solidarity Act") and ILSA.
See Yang Razali Kassim, US-Europe Rift Augurs Well for WITO, BuS. TIMES
(Singapore), Nov. 5, 1996, at 13. The ASEAN includes Brunei, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. See BARRY E. CARTER &
PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 580 (2d ed. 1995). Economic min-
isters from New Zealand and Australia also joined the ASEAN criticism of the
Sanctions and Solidarity Acts during a meeting in Jakarta in September of 1996.
See Yang Razali Kassim, US Softening Towards W'TO May Not Last, Bus. TIMES
(Singapore), Sept. 27, 1996, at 17.
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Act.3 Although simple rhetoric is a significant element underly-
ing this reproach of ILSA, claims of untoward extraterritoriality
directed at the Sanctions Act essentially challenge its viability at
the fundamental level of jurisdiction.
The problem of extraterritoriality, however, is not simple;
rather, it is a pervasive issue for international law continually am-
plified by the inevitable and increasing interdependence of na-
tional economies.4  Such interdependence perforce will lead to
clashes of national policy and claims of extraterritoriality. The
international economy thus faces the daunting task of weathering
legislative battles among nations, which often may only be re-
strained by the participants themselves. Although less than a free-
for-all, this environment is unpredictable and, therefore, costly
for those parties, both nations and their business entities, forced
to navigate it.
The U.S. Congress has demonstrated eagerness to oblige other
nations and their business interests to carry out its foreign policy
goals. Legislation like ILSA and the similarly contentious Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996
("Solidarity Act")5 represent both a projection of U.S. domestic
' See, e.g., Tom Buerkle, Bitterness over U.S.-EU Trade Deal Proves It a
Truce, Not a Settlement, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Apr. 15, 1997, at 6; Andrew Hill,
EU Condemns Cuba Sanctions but Delays Retaliation, Reuter Business Report,
Sept. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (quoting Irish
Foreign Minister Dick Spring's statement regarding the EU Foreign Ministers'
"absolute opposition to legislation with extra-territorial effects").
4 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L.
193, 193 (1996) ("Increasing international economic interdependence is obvi-
ously becoming a growing challenge to governments, which are frustrated by
their limited capacities to regulate or control cross-border economic activities.")
(citation omitted); John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 17, 24-25 (1996); Manfred Zuleeg, What Holds a
Nation Together? Cohesion and Democracy in the United States of-America and in
the European Union, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 505, 522 (1997).
5 The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified at 22 U.S.C.§ 6021 (1997)). The
Solidarity Act sanctions foreign nations, businesses, and citizens choosing to
invest or operate in Cuba. See generally Saturnino E. Lucio, II, The Cuban Lib-
erty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBER TAD) Act of 1996: An Initial Analysis, 27
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 325 (1995-96). For a debate over the viability of
the Solidarity Act, see generally Brice M. Clagett, The Cuban Liberty and Demo-
cratic Solidarity (LIBER TAD) Act: Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Is Consistent
with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 434-40(1996); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
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politics into the realm of international trade6 and a willingness by
Congress to employ secondary boycotts7 on foreign trading part-
ners and their nationals to achieve foreign policy preferences.
8
Although ILSA may represent a costless act of political expedi-
ency or some form of catharsis for recent tragedies to members of
Congress, it is problematic due to its international effects irrespec-
tive of its legality in an international system.
This Comment will view the extraterritoriality problem with
respect to ILSA based not on jurisdictional legality but upon its
impact on foreign trading partners. These effects represent the
Act: Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 419
(1996).
6 President Clinton initially expressed reservations about ILSA, which was
signed with an extravagant public ceremony and much rhetoric suggesting that
Clinton's assent was an act of "domestic political expediency." Vahe Petrossian,
US Escalates War of Words Against Iran, MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Aug. 30, 1996,
at 2, 3. Further, suspicion of terrorist involvement in the July 1996 crash of a
TWA 747 in the Long Island Sound and possible links between Iran and the
June bombing of a U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia, which resulted in the
deaths of 19 U.S. military personnel, provided additional political pressure dur-
ing the presidential campaign race tgat precluded anything but approval of
ILSA. See, e.g., Nancy Dunne & Robert Corzine, Politics Sets Tonefor Trade
Barriers, FIN. TIMES (London), July 25, 1996, at 4 (suggesting that suspicion of
terrorism in the crash of TWA 747 left President Clinton with no choice but to
sign ILSA); Steven Erlanger, Standoff with Iraq: The Strategy; Crumbling Walls:
U.S. Effort to Isolate Both Iran and Iraq Is Fraying Badly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1997, at A10 ("American policy makers have told some allied diplomats pri-
vately that if it were not for the 1996 law-and concern that Iran will be proven
responsible for the truck-bomb attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia,
which killed 19 American servicemen-Washington would be reviewing its Iran
policy.").
Special interest groups were also instrumental in the passage of ILSA. The
America Israel Public Affairs Committee ("AIPAC") assisted the drafting and
lobbying for passage of ILSA. See Jeffrey L. Snyder, ILSA Perplexes Foreign
Firms, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 1996, at C1;see also Hillel Kuttler, Clinton Signs Bill
to Punish Companies Dealing with Iran, Libya, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 6, 1996,
at 1 (noting that AIPAC "had made the bill a top priority" and "hail[ed] its
signing" into ILSA).
7 Secondary boycotts occur when any foreign country excludes another
country from certain trading rights and benefits cue to that country or foreign
national engaging in certain commercial activity with a third country. For ex-
ample, "state A says that if X, a national of state C, trades with state B, X may
not trade with or invest in A." Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 429.
8 Both ILSA and the Solidarity Act employ the secondary boycott,
"historically oposed by U.S. policymakers," as the primary means to restrict
economic deve opment in Iran, Libya, and Cuba. Snydersupra note 6, at C1.
It is interesting to note that the United States employed this failed technique
once before during the U.S. Pipeline Embargo of 1982. See infra Section 2.2.2.2.
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true difficulty with ILSA and with all extraterritorial legislation.
Unprincipled legislative battles fought in the arena of world trade
will be costly to the entire trading system and to its participants.
Cold War unilateralism certainly cannot succeed in a global sys-
tem that is both increasingly interdependent and dependent upon
interwoven national economies. Such an environment is hostile
to unilateralism.
Section 2 of this Comment, in an effort to determine an ana-
lytical framework for the viability of the secondary boycott estab-
lished in ILSA, discusses extraterritoriality along with sover-
eignty. This Comment will argue that the extraterritorial nature
of a state's act ultimately will not be dispositive in determining its
utility; rather, the extent of extraterritoriality and its associated
costs, together with its effects, will be determinative. These ef-
fects will be discussed in Section 2 with respect to the offensive or
defensive nature of extraterritorial legislation. Section 3 provides
an overview and discussion of relevant portions of ILSA. Section
4 analyzes the viability of the Sanctions Act and concludes that it
will probably be ineffective. Additionally, Section 4 offers a
modest recommendation for congressional reasonableness.
2. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE
EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONs
ACT
Extraterritoriality involves "the right to prescribe law, enforce
law, and adjudicate conflict outside the territory of a particular
state."9 Public international law confronts this issue when poli-
cies or, more pointedly, enforcement of national policies, collide.
2.1. Extraterritoriality and Sovereignty
Extraterritorial application of a nation's laws often produces
an instinctive reaction born of a perceived infringement on the
sovereignty of another nation. This perception is grounded in the
territorial theory of law that presumes that regulatory rights are
limited by territorial boundaries that create "a neat division of
9 Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU,
NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L
L. 231, 235 n.20; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining extraterritoriality as the operation of laws "upon persons, rights, or
jural relations, existing beyond the limits of the enacting state or nation, but
still amenable to its laws").
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power in the world."10 The international acceptance of nonmili-
tary coercion or persuasion, which usually takes the form of an
economic sanction, increasingly limits this principle of sover-
eignty. Nations often employ direct or primary boycotts and
other economic sanctions to achieve political goals.' 2  Sanctions
either may be coordinated among several nations or executed by
one state against another. 3 Nations often do not view these sanc-
tions as a violation of a country's sovereignty partly because they
are directed against some form of "unacceptable conduct."' 4 More
importantly, economic sanctions, although coercive to a degree,
is
simply represent the refusal of a nation to exercise its rights of
commerce or to allow its citizens to do the same with respect to
the targeted country regardless of the number of participant na-tions. w
1o CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 2, at 737.
11 See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the
Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1167 n.12 (1987) (citations
omitted) (reporting that widespread use of sanctions by nations indicates accep-
tance of sanctions by the international community).
12 See In Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 126 {une 27), the World Court found that economic sanctions including a
trade embargo, elimination of economic aid, and reduction of a sugar quota did
not violate the principle of nonintervention. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1167
n.12 (noting the approval of economic sanctions by the World Court in Nica-
ragua v. United States).
13 See Carter, supra note 11, at 1169.
14 Jeffrey K. Powell, Comment, Prohibitions on Camp aign Contributions
from Foreign Sources: Questioning Their Justification in a Global Interdependent
Economy, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 957, 985 (1996); see also Lowenfeld, supra
note 5, at 429 ("[A] primary boycott does not usually raise issues of interna-
tional law, because the boycotting state is exercising its jurisdiction in its own
territory or over its own nationals.").
15 See Carter, supra note 11, at 1166 (discussing the use of economic sanc-
tions as a method to change a foreign policy).
16 See Hans W. Baade, The Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 429, 443 (1995) ("[T]rade boycotts and embargoes are not contrary to pub-
lic international law in the absence of treaties to the contrary.. ").
More problematic are attempts to destabilize a nation's government. His-
torically, the United States has frequently used this tactic. For example, in the
1980s, U.S. foreign policy sought to destabilize the Sandinista government in
Nicaragua. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1171. More recently, in December
1995, Congress earmarked $18 million to support covert destabilization of the
government of Iran. See Kenneth R. Timmerman, Clinton Offers Iran a 'Frank
Dialogue" Tehran Views Gesture as Weakness, WASH. TIMES, June 24, 1996, at
Al.
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The conceptual validity of sovereignty is controversial.
17
Nevertheless, at some fundamental level, however defined, some
territorial authority for a nation must exist. A state must at least
have the ability to control its physical boundaries. Beyond this
static baseline of territorial sovereignty exists a dynamic "bundle"
of rights and duties that may be exchanged and often differ from
state to state." This concept of sovereignty recognizes the oppor-
tunity for the application and enforcement of extraterritorial leg-
islation in the international community.' 9 "Ultimately,... sov-
ereign states can, without violating international law, take actions
which have effect in the territory of other states."
20
2.2. Defensive vs. Offensive Extraterritoriality
The increasing interdependence of national economies in the
global system will intensify conflicts of law and policy. Thus,
17 See Joel P. Trachtman, Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty,
Power and Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 404 (1994) (discussing criticism
of the concept of sovereignty).
18 See id. at 402 (citing J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the
Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations,
48 INT'L ORG. 107 (1994) (discussing the various meanings of sovereignty));see
also Celia R. Taylor, A Modest Proposal: Statehood and Sovereignty in a Global
Age, 18 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 745, 752-56 (1997) (describing the "bundle of
sticks" concept of modern sovereignty).
19 See Taylor, supra note 18, at 762. Nations mutually can accept arbitra-
tion decisions as binding, which represents a willingness to sacrifice certain
rights in exchange for morepredictable trade relationships. See, e.g., Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission
of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competi-
tion Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., 30I.L.M. 1491 ("U.S.-E.C. Agreement")
(noting the importance of agreements for the efficient operation of interrelated
markets); Robert Hudec, Strengthening of Procedures for Settling Disputes, in
REMAKING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS FROM AN ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE (H. Corbet ed., 1995)
("After almost fifty years of GATT history... most GATT governments iden-
tify a mutual self-interest in maintaining respect for GATT legal obligations.").
For a recent discussion of the U.S.-E.C. Agreement and extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws, see generally Allison J. Himelfarb, Comment, The
International Language of Convergence: Reviving Antitrust Dialogue Between the
United States and the European Union with a Uniform Understanding of
"Extraterritoriality," 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 909 (1996).
"The customary international law rule of soverei n immunity illustrates the
central importance of state sovereignty in the moern world. The restrictive
theory of such immunity, on the other hand, demonstrates the need to accom-
modate respect for foreign sovereign rights to new circumstances, such as state
trading." Baade, supra note 16, at 440.
20 Baade, supra note 16, at 440.
[Vol 19:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss1/6
LRANAND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
preclusion of extraterritorial legislation altogether could produce
an unacceptable isolation of trading blocs due to the inability of
nations to protect their markets in a free trade regime. 21 Con-
versely, haphazard assertions of extraterritoriality could produce
equally harmful results. 22 When considering extraterritoriality,
the legitimacy of the principle should not be questioned;2 rather,
the principal inquiry should be whether its effects are acceptable.
Extraterritorial legislation may be loosely grouped into offensive
and defensive categories according to the type of targeted activity.
2.2.1. Defensive Extraterritoriality
Broadly, defensive extraterritorial legislation 24 seeks to protect
economic rights within the country of origin. The doctrine of
comity25 often governs this form of legislation. International
public law recognizes extraterritoriality in certain situations in
which one nation, applying comity, permits another nation to as-
sert its jurisdiction with an understanding of reciprocity and a
21 This outcome is readily identifiable in the area of antitrust enforcement.
See infra Section 2.2.1.1.
See James P. Rhatican, Comment, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Cali-
fornia: A Mixed Blessing for Insurance Antitrust Defendants, 47RUTGERS L. REV.
905, 955-56 (1995) (warning that prolific antitrust enforcement and failure to
include comity considerations could alienate the United States from its trading
partners and render it a "commercial police officer").
23 The Supreme Court, precluding a consideration of validity, has declared
that "Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States." EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991). See generally James Mathieu, Note, The Supreme Court's Not So
Clear Statement in: Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 939 (1996) (dscussing the incoherent
judicial treatment of extraterritorial application of U.S. law).
24 U.S. law has not always had extraterritorial reach. The dominant theory
of application at the turn of this century as expressed by Justice Holmes was
that the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as law-
ful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done." American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356
(190. The Supreme Court defined the doctrine in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 163-64 (1895):
"Comity"... is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience ....
1998]
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certain amount of goodwill.26 Comity is most effective when the
laws of the nations involved do not collide or the relative interests
of these nations weigh heavily toward the party asserting its juris-
diction.27 Defensive legislation often addresses the extraterritorial
activity of a foreign entity (including another nation) having, an
impact within the governable territory of the enacting nation.
2.2.1.1. Extraterritoriality and Competition Law
The most common situations involving defensive behavior by
nations occur in the context of competition law.29 "Most, if not
all, [U.S. allies and trading partners] have competition laws" and,
despite a mutual recognition of the need for multilateral coopera-
tion, the "intractable difference over extraterritoriality has gener-
ated friction between otherwise friendly governments." ° Take,
for example, the controversial issue of treble damages under the
Clayton Act of 1912.3' These triple damage awards, applicable to
commerce with foreign nations, particularly pique U.S. trading
26 See Peter Durack, Australia: Conflicts and Comity, in ACT OF STATE AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 41, 43 (John R. Lacey ed., 1983).
2 Seei.
28 This action is an example of negative comity. See Himelfarb, supra note
19, at 914 & n.24.
29 Although primarily a judicial innovation, U.S. antitrust legislation car-
ries a presumption of extraterritoriality. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (holding that antitrust legislation applies to for-
eign insurance companies); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6, (1986) (discussing the application of the Sherman Act to
the conduct of foreign nations when such conduct affects U.S. commerce);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704
96 (stating that the monopolization or restraint of commerce that occurs in
foreign countries is still witin the reach of the Sherman Act). U.S. antitrust
law thus answered market abuses occurring within the United States. See Mark
P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of US. Law: The Perversion of Demo-cratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutionl Roles, and the Imperative of Estab-
lishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 298 & n.4
(1996). As the need for defensive measures to reduce the domestic impact of
activities from abroad became more recognizable and the United States was
dragged from isolationist idyll, the judiciary answered the call. See id.
3 Durack, supra note 26, at 41; see also Himelfarb, supra note 19, at 947-55
(recognizing the need for harmonization of competition laws between the
United States and the European Union).
31 See 15 U.S.C. SS 12-27 (1997). Treble damages under the Clayton Act
triple the amount awarded for an antitrust violation in actions brought by pri-
vate parties or the federal government when standing as an injured plaintiff. See
id. § 15.
32 See idi S 12.
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partners.33  The United States increasingly has broadened the
definition of nationality of corporations to establish prescriptive
jurisdiction over entities organized under the laws of other na-
tions whether they are subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, parent
companies of subsidiaries within the United States, or corpora-
tions otherwise under control of U.S. citizens through investment
ownership. 34  Such expansive jurisdictional doctrine necessarily
will produce more opportunities for international conflicts.
"Blocking"35 statutes and "claw-back"3 6 provisions represent
the primary legislative responses to U.S. antitrust enforcement.
These statutes are multifarious, but their common goal is to pre-
vent or obstruct enforcement of extraterritorial competition
law.37 Many such statutes historically were enacted on an ad hoc
basis to counter narrowly assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction by
the United States in particular industries or specific cases. 39 A
3 The United Kingdom regards "treble damage proceedings as penal and
more on a par with criminal proceedings than with normal civil actions." Wil-
liam Knighton, Britain: Blocking and Claw-Back, in ACT OF STATE AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH, supra note 26, at 54.
" See id. at 52 (noting that the United States will, in some cases, assert ju-
risdiction over foreign corporations with only 25% ownership by U.S. share-
holders).
35 Blocking statutes include a broad category of legislation intended to
block assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction and limit their effects. See, e.g.,
Competition Act, ch. C-34, S 82(c) (1985) (Can.) (decreeing that foreign judg-
ments that adversely affect competition or trade in Canada do not have to be
implemented); see also Deborah A. Sabalot, Comment, Shortening the Long Arm
of American Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extraterritoriality and the Foreign B ocking
Statutes, 28 LoY. L. REV. 213, 276-79 (1982) (listing various blocking statutes
enacted in response to U.S. antitrust enforcement).
3 Claw-back legislation allows a party against whom the court awards an-
titrust damages to bring an action for recovery of noncompensatory elements,
such as treble damages, of a judgment. See Protection of Trading Interests Act,
1980, ch. 11, S 6 (Eng.). This English claw-back provision partly rests upon the
long-standing presumption that "'the penal law of one country cannot be taken
notice of in another.'" Baade, supra note 16, at 438 (quoting Ogden v. Folliott,
[1790] 3 T.R. 726, 733 (K.B.)).
37 See R. Edward Price, Foreign Blocking Statutes and the GA TT" State Sover-
eignty and the Enforcement of U.S. Economic Laws Abroad, 28 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'LL. & ECON. 315, 325 (1995).
38 See Durack, supra note 26, at 45 (listing Australia, Belgium, Canada and
its provinces of Ontario and Quebec, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, It-
aly, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United King-
dom as having passed ad hoc blocking legislation); see also Gary B. Born, A Re-
appraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach 6f U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1, 67 (1992) (discussing the enactment of foreign legislation to block extraterri-
torial application of U.S. law).
1998]
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protectionist element lurks beneath the sovereignty rhetoric ac-
companying passage of such blocking statutes
Several nations recently have enacted general blocking statutes
which are much broader than ad hoc legislation.39  These acts
generally proscribe, either wholly or in part, compliance with
foreign tribunals in any matter.4 0 Identifying a protectionist mo-
tivation behind these statutes is difficult. Ad hoc blocking stat-
utes often may concern protecting or subsidizing a particular in-
dustry,4' whereas general statutes reflect mostly a nation's
economic and foreign policy decision to defend its autonomy.
42
General blocking statutes intuitively may appear to pose a
much greater impediment to international trade and agreements
than the more limited ad hoc legislation. The greater scope of
general statutes, however, requires that nations approach obstruct-
ing extraterritoriality carefully. Certainly, legitimate activities,
such as extradition or some antitrust actions, must be permitted
to pass through this protective screen. In this respect, general
blocking statutes may be seen as a legislative attempt to respond
to several competing pressures, such as: concern over preserving
determination of economic policy, interests of other nations in
preventing anticompetitive behavior having an impact within
their borders, and the overarching desire to accommodate these
interests within an international system that increasingly seeks
normalization of economic activity.
Blocking statutes present a particularly difficult problem for
international public law. They juxtapose the interests of one state
affected by anticompetitive conduct abroad and the interests of
another state in protecting its territorial sovereignty. Both en-
forcement of extraterritorial protection laws and blocking statutes
are defensive measures that pose a conflict of laws problem rather
than a violation of customary international law.4 A comity re-
gime requiring reciprocity and compromise much like multilat-
eral trade agreements may adequately protect both the interests of
39 See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, S 6 (Eng.).
40 See, e.g., Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. ch. F-29, S 3,5(1) (1984) (Can.).
See Price, supra note 37, at 324 (noting that the purpose of blocking stat-
utes is to protect the viability of an industry from foreign forces).
42 See Durack, supra note 26, at 45 (discussing the enactment of blocking
statutes for general defensive reasons).
41 See id. at 43.
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the state affected by anticompetitive conduct and of the state pro-
tecting its territorial sovereignty. Certainly, attempts at such
agreements have been made, but the principal example between
the European Union ("EU") and the United States met with little
success. International trade agreements are probably the proper
and, likely, the most effective mechanism for harmonizing these
competing interests.
2.2.1.2. Multinational Corporations: A Problematic Role
in the Difficulties of Extraterritoriality
The role of transnational corporate actors in the difficulties of
extraterritoriality is of noteworthy concern. Corporate miscon-
duct is a problem inherent in an international system governed by
agreements rather than force of law.45 The Supreme Court often
faces criticism for failing to combat corporate transiressions by
applying territorial restrictions to health and safety,6 and envi-
ronmental and labor laws.47 The result is that subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations organized under the laws of another country are not
subject to often stricter labor and environmental regulations. The
Court, however, has not hesitated to extend the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. laws in the areas of trademark and securities, 48 anti-
trust, and criminal enforcement.49
44 See generally Himelfarb, supra note 19 (indicating the failure of the multi-
lateral trade agreement between the European Union and the United States).
45 See Durack, supra note 26, at 43; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGrrIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3 (1990) ("In the international sys-
tem, rules usually are not enforced. . . ."). This loose system of agreements
helps explain legislation like the Solidarity Act and ILSA: sprawling transna-
tional commerce makes cooperative enforcement of an embargo difficult, and
Con ress' answer to this difficulty recently has been unilateral extraterritoriallegislation.
46 See, e.g., Gibney, supra note 29, at 300 n.8.
See, e.g., id. at 300 ("[C]ertain areas of the law, most notably labor regula-
tions and environmental legislation, were, and continue to be, given strict terri-
torial readings.") (citations omitted).
48 See, e.g., id. at 299 ("[T]he judiciary [] gave a very broad jurisdictional
reading to trademark and securities laws. . .) (citations omitted).
49 See, e.g., id. at 303 ("[A]ny hesitancy in applying and enforcing American
criminal law overseas apparently ended some time ago.").
It has been suggested that there is a method to the incoherence: "U.S. law
has been applied extraterritorially when that has served the national interest of
the United States or its corporate actors, and it has been given a territorial ap-
plication when a restrictive interpretation would serve those same ends." Id at
304. This criticism, although interesting, may not be entirely accurate. Not
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The multinational corporation ("MNC") as a global actor re-
quires regulation to ensure the operation of national commercial
laws and to deter the potential for abuse. For example, a MNC
may seek to incorporate a subsidiary in a foreign jurisdiction for
the purpose of avoiding costly local laws and regulations.
50
Moreover, nations with disparate enforcement powers and those
with relatively undeveloped public law invite transnational abuses
as well.5' Corporations without borders thus require regulation
without borders. Without international regulation, MNCs may
operate, at their worst, as economic guerrillas beyond the reach of
enforcing labor laws overseas could compromise prices in the United States: if
company X operating in country A with a subsidiary in country B can exploit
labor conditions in country B and produce a cheaper product than its counter-
part, company Y, can produce in countryA, then companyX can undercut the
price system in countryA. Therefore, this coherence argument cannot explain
the differing results of such a situation. Although it may be in the nation-al in-
terest to keep consumer prices low, it is not advantageous to encourage the ex-
portation of labor intensive work to other more hospitable foreign countries.
Rather, what appears to be at work is a side effect of both the decentralized
three-branch system of government in the United States and the federal system
in which U.S. states increasingly are able to legislate beyond their state and
their national borders. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); Ste-
ven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REV. 23, 45-46 (1995); Moises Naim, Clinton's Foreign Policy: A Victim of
Globalization?, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1997-98, at 34, 42 ("Devolution has
gone global. From England to India and from Japan to Argentina, Russia, and
the United States, power is shifting from federal to state and local govern-
ments.").
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647
F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981), a territorial decision had the potential for disastrous
results within and without the United States. The court refused to apply U.S.
environmental, safety, and health standards to the sale by Westinghouse of a
substandard nuclear reactor to the Philippines that was to be built at the base of
an active volcano and sitting atop a fault line. Although a natural disaster
would have caused an unnatural one likely resulting in the devastation of the
Philippines, including the 40,000 U.S. citizens located at military installations
within a 50-mile radius of the site; a restrictive application of environmental
guidelines here does not seem to serve any interest. See also Gibney,supra note
29, at 300, n.8 (discussing U.S. resistance to apply U.S. law to enforce environ-
mental, health, and safety regulations abroad by focusing on theNatural Re-
sources Defense Council decision).
5 See Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The ExtraterritorialApplication of
United States Law and the Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational
Corporations to Domestic and International Standardi, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
LJ. 123, 127 (1996) ("[Nleither the U.S. government nor U.S. multinational
corporations should engage in practices overseas that would be illegal if carried
out in this country.").
51 See id. at 125 ([T]hroughout the Third World... multinational[]
[corporations] are essentially governed by no law at all.").
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law. Their abusive actions threaten to invite clumsy, overbroad
retaliation, such as excessive and unwarranted extraterritorial en-
forcement activities and blocking statutes.
2.2.1.3. Effects Analysis
Anticompetitive behavior and blocking statutes generate inef-
ficiencies. First, raising walls of defensive legislation increases the
transaction costs of conducting international business, because de-
termination of the feasibility of ventures under existing legal re-
gimes requires litigation and investigation.5 2 Second, anticompeti-
tive behavior and industry-specific, ad hoc blockin%3 statutes
adversely affect international and national price systems.
Courts in the United States have been inconsistent in applying
domestic law to extra-national conduct.5 4 Incoherent judicial ap-
proaches to extraterritoriality limit the possibility of determining
whether proposed transnational activity will result in a conflict of
laws and of evaluating the probability of litigation. One inciden-
tal result is the creation of an incentive for foreign entities to set-
tle claims rather than confront the complexities of litigating the
issue and face possible sanctions levied upon them by their own
governments through blocking statutes for complying with U.S.
extraterritoriality 
provisions.y
52 Increasing defensive legislation can be anticompetitive in itself by mak-
ing the cost of conducting certain transnational activities prohibitive. See supra
Section 2.2.1.1.
13 The distorted effects of anticompetitive behavior are diverse. An inter-
national cartel or agreement could operate to inflate prices, in a manner similar
to a classic monopoly. Additionally, a corporation or an alliance of corpora-
tions could, by absorbing short-term losses, attempt to deflate prices in the do-
mestic market of a specific nation to eliminate competition and colonize the
market with its own goods.
Blocking statutes also may distort price systems: "[t]he legal insulation pro-
vided by blocking statutes thus functions in a subsidy-like manner because it
encourages affected industries to continue to operate as cartels and thereby
charge artificially high (or low) prices to maintain their profitability or exis-
tence." Price, supra note 37, at 324-25.54
See generally Gibney, supra note 29, at 301 (discussing the judiciary's ex-
pansive and territorial interpretations of extraterritoriality statutes).
55 See, e.g., Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, % 3,
5(1)(b) (1984) (Can.) (establishing a maximum penalty of $10,000 (Can.) and/or
not more than five years in prison for contravening an order to disobey foreign
tribunal requests). Therefore, a party subject to a foreign judgment in addition
to domestic sanctions essentially must pay a double penalty for a single activity
or transaction.
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This inefficient settlement incentive simply encourages initia-
tion of more claims due to the increased likelihood of a successful
outcome. There are incentives here for parties and their counsel
to bring such claims because of the attractive possibility of a
monetary settlement without engaging in complex international,
and therefore expensive, litigation. Further, the fact that a defen-
dant may face treble damages in U.S. courts encourages settle-
ment. Even in nations that have claw-back statutes like Great
Britain, a party will be forced to commence an additional action
in its own judicial system to reclaim multiple damage awards
which may result in an economic nullity.
56
The importance of this analysis is to understand that a regime
of comity may solve many problems associated with extraterrito-
riality and defensive countermeasures. Addressing the effects of
enforcement actions, blocking statutes, and other defensive meas-
ures will mitigate much of their attendant difficulties. That is not
to say that conflicts will disappear, especially in the realm of
competition, but a more principled and coherent regime will be
able to combat obstacles to free exchange more effectively rather
than entrench them. Offensive legislation like ILSA may not be
so amenable.
2.2.2. Offensive Extraterritoriality
Offensive extraterritoriality seeks compulsion of a nation to
undertake some affirmative act or to refrain from a certain activ-
ity. Although similar to the coercive component of defensive ex-
traterritoriality, offensive extraterritoriality does not necessarily• - 57
respond to internal effects of extranational conduct. Economic
sanctions are a legitimate form of such extraterritoriality.5 8 A re-
cent example is the collective international effort to combat
apartheid in South Africa. 9 This effort is representative of the
advantageous and morally justifiable uses of offensive extraterrito-
See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, 5 6 (Eng.)
(describing qualifications for seeking recovery of overseas multiple damages
awards in the United Kingdom).
s7 ILSA, for instance, does not respond to any effects in U.S. territory
caused by foreign investment in the energy sectors of Iran and Libya. See Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1997)).
58 See Carter, supra note 11, at 1167 n.12.
59 See, e.g., id at 1165 (noting the limited scope of sanctions agrst South
Africa and calling for legislative change to promote similar sanctions).
[Vol 19:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss1/6
IRANAND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
riality in the international system. Difficulties arise when exces-
sive extraterritoriality affects policy making and the economic
sovereignty of other nations.
2.2.2.1. Boycotts and Offensive Extraterritoriality
The trade boycott is a subcategory of economic sanctions,
broadly composed of primary and secondary boycotts.60 A na-
tion imposing a primary boycott will restrain its citizens and cor-
porations from trading with a state or group of states.61 Although
certainly coercive, international law permits primary boycotts to
achieve foreign policy goals unless they are unreasonable.62 Diffi-
culties with such boycotts arise, however, when they include a
broad definition of nationality. The United States considers per-
sons under its territorial jurisdiction to include not only its citi-
zens and corporations organized under U.S. laws, but also corpo-
rations owned or controlled by such citizens or corporations,
which include corporations organized under the laws of a foreign
country.63  If country A employs a boycott against country B,
country A may attempt to levy sanctions against corporation X,
organized under the laws of C and a subsidiary of corporation Y
incorporated in country A, for failure to comply with the condi-
tions of the boycott even though X's activities are legal in country
C. This broad assertion of control is an "extended primary boy-
cott," which blurs its distinction from 
secondary boycotts. 6
60 For an anatomical study of trade boycotts, see Henry J. Steiner,Interna-
tional Boycotts and Domestic Order: American Involvement in the Arab-Israeli
Conflict, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1355, 1367-70 (1976).
6' See id. at 1367.
61 "The frequent use of these [economic] sanctions by many countries con-
stitutes persuasive evidence that no clear norm exists against them in customary
international law." Carter, supra note 11, at 1167 n.12.
63 Cf 50 U.S.C. S 2405(a)(1) (1994) (extending broad foreign policy control
to the President).
6 Steiner, supra note 60, at 1369. Extended primary boycotts also include
proscription of trade involving products with components made in the target
country as well as the reexport by foreign entities ofproducts originating from
the boycotting state, including products incorporating component parts also
originating from the boycotting state. See id. The United States has even ex-
tended primary boycotts to include products made by licensee corporations in
third-party countries. See 50 U.S.C. 5 2405(a)(1); Sarah J. Cogswell, Comment,
In the Wake of the Pipeline Embargo: European-United States Dialogue, 12 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 73, 76-77 (1984).
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The secondary boycott seeks to halt third-party nations from
trading with the target country.6s This essentially amounts to an
infringement on foreign policy making in third-party countries
where trading with the target nation is not prohibited. These
countries, not surprisingly, resist such application of another na-
tion's foreign policy.6 6  One typical response to secondary boy-
cotts is refusal to obey.67 Secondary boycotts technically do not
contravene customary international law, because sanctions gener-
ally apply only to parties having contacts with the enacting
state. Therefore, secondary boycotts may simply be an applica-
tion of territorial authority. The potential impact of such boy-
cotts within the territory of third-party nations, however, poses
an extraterritoriality problem.
69
2.2.2.2. The Case of the U.S. Pipeline Embargo of 1982
In June 1982, President Reagan enacted an extended primary
boycott on the export and reexport of U.S. technology and oil
and gas equipment to be used in a natural gas pipeline from the
Soviet Union to Europe.70 President Reagan justified the boycott
as an appropriate response to the imprisonment of the leaders of
the Solidarity Movement in Poland and the enactment of martial
law in that country in December 1981. 7 1 European nations re-
acted strongly to this extraterritorial embargo. Great Britain and
France ordered affected parties under its jurisdiction to disobey
the trade restrictions, and the European Economic Community
sent an official protest to the United States.72 President Reagan
65 See Steiner, supra note 60, at 1368-69.
66 See, e.g., id. at 1374-84 (discussing the U.S. reaction to the Arab League
secondary boycott).
67 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 11, at 1194 (noting refusal of nations to ad-
here to the U.S. pipeline embargo in 1982).
68 See, e.g., Clagett, supra note 5, at 436; Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 429-30.
69 See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at. 430 (noting that peacetime imposition of
a secondary boycott "is contrary to international law, because it seeks unrea-
sonably to coerce conduct that takes place wholly outside of the state purport-
ing to exercise its jurisdiction to prescribe").
70 See Amendment of Oil and Gas Controls to the U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg.
27,250 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 376, 379, 385); Cogswell,supra
note 64, at 73.
71 See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 432 (citing Statement of President Reagan
on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union Covering Its Involvement in
Poland, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1429 (Dec. 29, 1981)).
72 See Cogswell, supra note 64, at 79.
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ultimately retracted the embargo due to domestic and interna-
tional pressure and the failure of third-party nations to comply.73
The pipeline embargo represents a direct conflict between
U.S. and European law and foreign policy. Although this conflict
represents a diplomacy issue rather than a legal one,7 4 the actors
caught in the middle are multinational corporations. Any course
of action they take will violate either the laws of their third-party
nation of incorporation or those of the enacting country.75 This
is essentially a situation of forced institutional cognitive disso-
nance7 6 whereby a corporation is compelled to function knowing
its actions are both legal and illegal. Companies facing this situa-
tion are forced to make a choice, one which may be impossible to
execute due to already existing public and/or private legal obliga-
tions. The result of this distasteful compulsion may be a future
coloring of the afflicted company's interactions, not with the
United States, but with its corporations.
2.2.2.3. Effects Analysis
Secondary boycotts and extended primary boycotts encounter
the same international problems. Resorting to a secondary boy-
cott partly represents the lack of international agreement as to the
73 See Revision of Export Controls Affecting the U.S.S.R. and Poland, 47
Fed. Reg. 51,858 (1982) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 376, 379, 385);ee also
Carter, supra note 11, at 1195 & n.130 (stating that President Reagan rescinded
the regulations because of heavy allied opposition, pressures from the U.S.
business community and Congress, and the regulations' impotence when Euro-
pean companies nonetheless performed their contractual duties).
74 See Cogswell, supra note 64, at 84.
75 See Carter, supra note 11, at 1195 n.129 (describing Compagnie Eu-
ropeenne Des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V., Dist. Ct. at the Hague,
reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983), in which Sensor, a U.S. subsidiary incorporated
in the Netherlands, was compelled to honor a sales contract in violation of the
U.S. boycott).
For a similar case involving a U.S. corporation and the Arab League secon-
dary boycott of Israel, see the discussion of United States v. Bechtel Corp.,
Civil No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 16, 1976), in Lionel Kestenbaum, The
Antitrust Challenge to the Arab Boycott: Per Se Theory, Middle East Politics, and
United States v. Bechtel Corporation, 54 TEX. L. REv. 1411 (1976). Bechtel
was accused of antitrust violations when he complied with the Arab boycott of
Israel by declining to deal with U.S. firms blacklisted under the boycott in the
United States. See id. at 1412.
76 Cognitive dissonance is a "psychological conflict resulting from incon-
gruous beliefs and attitudes held simultaneously." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 223 (10th ed. 1993).
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proper policy to employ with respect to the target country.'
This can often result in the imposition of blocking statutes which
make compliance with the secondary boycott illegal within a na-
tion condemning such economic sanctions. Alternatively, a na-
tion will instruct those within its jurisdiction to ignore the secon-
dary boycott.
7
The secondary boycott particularly is an unpalatable course of
action because it can have a real impact within third-party coun-
tries. 79 Such economic sanctions will influence business decisions
within third-party nations and create the potential for inefficient,
non-optimal choices by economic actors. Further, the transac-
tion costs of conducting multinational business activities may rise
due to the delay and expense of investigating the potential impact
of a commercial transaction running afoul of the boycott, the
laws of the business' third-party country of origin, or both." The
stakes in such a transaction, of course, depend upon the relative
power and economic importance of the enacting nation and of the
targeted nation.
3. THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
The salient feature of ILSA is that it seeks to impose secon-
dary boycotts on foreign nationals with respect to the energy sec-
tors of Iran and Libya.12  These secondary boycotts intend to
limit the capabilities of Iran and Libya from sponsoring terrorism
77 See Jacques Attali, A View from Europe (I), FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter
1997-98, at 54, 57 (arguing that international law requires consensus rather than
unilateral legislation).
78 See supra Section 2.2.1.1.; see also Cogswell, supra note 64, at 79 (noting
that Great Britain and France ordered their companes to ignore the U.S. pipe-
line sanctions). The United States itself has a blocking statute for secondary
boycotts against friendly nations. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407 (1994).
79 See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 60, at 1371-72 (noting that requests for sub-
missions in compliance with the Arab boycott may have affected as much as
$4.5 billion worth of transactions). The U.S. banking industry shouldered
much of the burden of filing requests for compliance with the boycott. See id.
at 1392. Thus, compliance with boycott requests may increase the transaction
costs of international commercial dealings and perhaps deter some ventures.
8 See id. at 1391. Secondary boycotts violate "principles of free trade and
allocational efficiency" by deflecting "foreign trade from channels that would
have been followed in a free market." Id. Further, it alters "internal trade rela-
tionships" of third-party countries. Id.
81 See supra Section 2.2.1.3.
82 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 5, 110
Stat. 1541 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1997)).
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and acquiring weapons of mass destruction.83 Congressional frus-
tration over the inability of the United States to orchestrate a
multilateral and cohesive international strategy with respect to
Iran and Libya, in part, appears to drive ILSA.
ILSA requires the President to apply at least two of seven pos-
sible sanctions against foreign interests investing either more than
$40 million in one year (or projects of at least $10 million that ex-
ceed $40 million in the aggregate in one year) in Libya or more
than $20 million in Iran that "directly and significantly" contrib-
ute to petroleum developments in these countries.85 The sanc-
tions available to the President include: refusal of insurance,
guarantee, or extension of credit to a sanctioned person by the
Export-Import Bank of the United States;86 restriction of export
of goods or technology from the United States to any sanctioned
person;87 prohibition of imports to the United States which are
produced by any sanctioned person;88 prohibition of U.S. finan-
cial institutions from extending loans or credit in excess of $10
million to any sanctioned person in a twelve-month period;89
revocation of the status of primary dealer of U.S. debt instru-
ments for any sanctioned financial institution;'0 prohibition of a
sanctioned financial institution from acting as an agent of the U.S.
government or serving as a repository of government funds;9' and
prohibition of government contracts with a sanctioned party.92
83 See H.R. 3107, 104th Cong. S 3 (1996).
84 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 4(a) (urging the United States to es-
tablish a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran. It is ironic that Congress
has selected a unilateral means in the hopes of effectuating multilateral coopera-
tion. The means chosen by Congress have served only to unite the entire
European Union over the common issue of U.S. extraterritoriality. See supra
note 2; see also A Warning from Ouagadougou, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1997-
98, at 59, 59.
85 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 5(a), (b)(2). The Sanctions Act requires
imposition of sanctions for trade with Libya in violation of United Nations
Resolutions 748 and 883. See id. S 5(b)(1). The limit of $20 million imposed on
Iran was changed from $40 million in August 1997. See Down with Free Trade,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 4-10, 1997, at 50.
86 See H.R. 3107, 104th Cong. S 5(1).
87 See id. S 5(2)(A).
88 See id. S 5(2) (B).
89 See id. S 5(3).
'0 See a S 5 (4) (A).
91 See id.a 5(4) (B).
92 See a S 5(5).
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ILSA seeks to compel foreign nations to impose economic
sanctions on the targeted countries by operation of an executive
clause.93  The President may waive nationwide imposition of
sanctions upon a country's nationals if he produces a report find-
ing that the country in question has imposed economic sanctions
on Iran for the purposes of preventing sponsorship of terrorism
and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. 9 The lan-
guage of the Sanctions Act suggests that the President may only
waive sanctions if nations similarly restrict development of Iran's
energy sector. 95 The House Ways and Means Committee, how-
ever, claims that countries may execute sanctions that differ from
the U.S. embargo to meet presidential waiver requirements.
96
Congress provided the President with an escape clause, however,
which allows a waiver of sanctions on nationals on a case-by-case
basis if such waiver is "important to the national interest of the
United States ... "97
Any imposition of sanctions "under [the Sanctions] Act shall
not be reviewable in any court."9 8 Upon request of an interested
party, the Secretary of State may issue an advisory opinion as to
the legality of any proposed transaction under ILSA. 9 Further,
good faith reliance upon an advisory opinion that states that the
inquiring party will not be subject to sanctions will protect the
inquiring party from sanctions. In practice, therefore, all par-
ties conducting any borderline transactions will be required to
seek an advisory opinion. The advisory opinion and non-
reviewability provisions work together to produce an odd result.
If two parties engage in the same type of transaction and one re-
quests and receives an advisory opinion declaring the activity ac-
ceptable, upon a decision by the President that such activity actu-
ally violates ILSA (perhaps due to publicity and pressure by
9' See id. S 4(A).
9' See id. S 8(c).
9 See id. Congress has determined that Iran's petroleum industry is crucial
for providing fun& to support its rogue activities. See id. § 3.
"'[T]here may be approaches or actions by other countries to inhibit
Iran's activities that differ from the current U.S. embargo .... '" Snydersupra
note 6, at C12.97 H.R. 3107 S 8 (c) (1).
" Id. S 12.
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members of Congress), the party not requesting an advisory opin-
ion will face sanctions while the other party will not. While this
potential inconsistency is a minimal effect of ILSA, it exacerbates
the more fundamental problems with offensive extraterritoriality
of this variety.
4. PROBABLE FAILURE OF ILSA AND A PROPOSAL FOR
MITIGATION OF ITS EFFECTS
Although ILSA may not violate customary international law,
it is still problematic, because it is unreasonable and has the po-
tential for far-ranging, unintended effects. 1' The Sanctions Act
provides a useful paradigm of the changing international eco-
nomic order. Increasing interdependence of economies compli-
cates the formulation and, more importantly, the implementation
of foreign policy by nations. 02 Such conflicts are likely to con-
tinue and intensify absent efforts to supplement free trade efforts
with considerations of reasonableness in international conduct
and multilateral attempts to solve international problems. 10 3 The
concerted international effort to eliminate apartheid in South Af-
rica demonstrates the powerful capability of multilateral efforts to
effectuate reform in troublesome nations.
4.1. Blocking Legislation: Filling the Cold War Power Vacuum
The United States likely will face a host of responses to its en-
forcement of ILSA. The European Union drafted legislation pro-
tecting its corporations from judgments levied under the Solidar-
ity Act; this countermeasure has been drafted sufficiently broad to
mitigate the effects of ILSA as well. 0 4 Great Britain likely will
employ the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980"05 to pro-
tect its corporations and subsidiaries organized under British law
101 For a discussion of the potential impact of ILSA on financial institu-
tions, see generally Clyde Mitchell, The New Sanctions Act, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 21,
1996, at 3.
102 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., Attali, supra note 77, at 57.
104 See, e.g., John Roberts, Europe-Trade: Europe Plans Tough Response to
U.S. Sanctions, Inter Press Service, Aug. 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Inpres File (indicating the flexibility of the EU legislation with respect to
dealing with the harmful effects of ILSA).
105 See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, S 6 (Eng.)see also
supra notes 36, 39 and accompanying text (describing generally the Protection
of Trading Interests Act).
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from ILSA. 1°' Canada and France have also prepared blocking
legislation should ILSA have effects within those countries.
0 7
These legal salvos suggest a developing trend in international
commercial law. There is increasing competition between trading
blocs to assert their economic influence in developing nations of
which these jurisdictional battles are a part. Recent U.S. attempts
to strangulate the Cuban economy and thereby compel demo-
cratic reform is instructive. 08 As the United States pursues its al-
ienation policy, the European Union actively is seeking to
strengthen its economic ties with the island nation.109 This juxta-
position is also readily apparent in Iran and Libya. The current
political dancing is not unlike the power struggles that pervaded
the Cold War, the bipolar international regime marked by the
stalemate of nuclear parity between the United States and the
former Soviet Union. The United States appears willing to con-
tinue unilateral implementation of foreign policy; a tactic much
more effective when U.S. allies lived under the specter, whether a
reality or a Cold War fiction, of armed confrontation.11
Unilateral directives like ILSA and other assertions of extra-
territoriality by the United States coupled with subsequent re-
sponses from U.S. trading partners pose an increasing threat to
free trade. Further, the United States is compromising its posi-
tion in its own trading region. Canada initiated a response to
ILSA and the Solidarity Act."' Although ILSA has an eye to-
106 See Roberts, supra note 104.
107 See id. (reporting on French legislation intended to block the negative
effects of ILSA); see also US Over-reaches, PRESS (London), Sept. 4, 1996, at 11
(quoting Art Eggleton, Canadian Minister of International Trade: "[t]he extra-
territorial effects of this latest act represent once again an attempt by the US to
dictate trade policy to its allies").
108 See supra note 5.
109 See Improving Relations Between the EU and Cuba, RAPID, Nov. 18,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Rapid File. The Economic and Social
Committee of the EU produced a twenty-page report advocating conclusion of
a trade and cooperation agreement as soon as possible that would allow the EU
to take advantage of failing U.S.-Cuba relations and strengthen EU presence in
Latin America. See id.
110 In fact, such unilateralism failed even during the Cold War during the
1982 Pipeline Embargo. See supra Section 2.2.2.2.
. See Trade, Politics a Volatile Mix, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Sept. 18,
1996, at 28; see also EU/US: EU Overcomes Danish Reserve to Agree CuT'a Re-
taliatory Measures, European Report, Oct. 30, 1996, No. 2170, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File (stating that the European Union possesses a
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ward creating a multilateral response to rogue behavior by Iran
and Libya, it intends to compel such a response through unilateral
economic sanctions. The European Union, which purchases
twenty percent of its imported oil from Libya and Iran, likely
will not countenance an imposition of sanctions against its com-
panies developing additional sources of energy.
1 12
4.2. Economic Sanctions Unlikely to Succeed
U.S. efforts to isolate Iran and Libya have met with little suc-
cess. This partly is due to an unwillingness by allies and trading
partners of the United States to adopt U.S. foreign policy en-
forcement mechanisms.1 3  The mixed success of such penalties
explains another reason for the likely failure of economic sanc-
tions.
114
States subjected to economic sanctions have become increas-
ingly resistant to such measures. 115 The failure of sanctions to dis-
suade foreign nationals from engaging in trade with Iran and
Libya may be linked to two trends. First, the increasing interde-
pendence of national economies and aggressive expansion of trad-
ing blocs combine to make states less dependent upon the United
States for trade. Second, other countries are still willing to assist
nations under U.S. sanctions." 6 During the Cold War, the Soviet
Union would often provide assistance to countries at odds with
the United States. 117 This role currently is occupied more often
than not by the EU or its member nations. 118 Economic sanc-
tions also have proven less successful when directed at achieving
legal framework to defend interests that may be threatened by ILSA and the
Solidarity Act).
112 See Roberts, supra note 104.
113 The EU advocates a policy of "critical dialoue" implemented in 1980
which has also been relatively unsuccessful. See Amir Taheri, Editorial, To In-
fluence Iran's Mullahs, Speak in One Voice, INT'L HERALD TuB. (France), Aug.
15, 1996 ("The American stick and the European carrot, used separately, don't
work.").
114 One study calculated that economic sanctions imposed by the United
States between 1945 and 1985 succeeded about 40% of the time. See Carter, su-




118 See supra note 109 (discussing EU efforts to establish economic ties with
Cuba); see also Taheri, supra note 113 (indicating the EU's plan to assist Iran af-
ter ILSA).
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more narrow policy goals, such as deterring nations from sup-
porting terrorism. Nonetheless, narrow policy goals are more
successful when sanctions have immediate effect and when they
are levied against nations with smaller economies.
20
The Sanctions Act will likely fail to curb Iran and Libya's
rogue behavior. Because Libya and Iran provide one-fifth of the
EU's oil imports, the EU needs to maintain amicable relations
with both countries. 12 ' Further, Libya has steady trading partners
in France and Italy, and Iran has significant relationships with
Turkey, Germany, and France. 122 The focus on constricting de-
velopment of Iran's petroleum industry by ILSA will likely have
minimal short-term impact. 123 Finally, both Iran and Libya have
expanding economies." The historical success of economic sanc-
tions and all of these factors indicate that ILSA is not likely to
achieve its goals.
Over the last four years, the United States has enacted eighty-
one laws levying economic sanctions against thirty-six different
countries.125 This legislative trend indicates a U.S. willingness to
sacrifice world trade liberalization to achieve its foreign policy
goals. It is arguable that trade liberalization should be the ulti-
mate goal of U.S. foreign policy.
Perhaps much of this legislation is in fact designed to restrain
economic competition. It is possible that unilateral sanctions may
be enacted to protect large U.S. business interests already pre-
vented from trading with certain countries by leveling the playing
119 See Carter, supra note 11, at 1174.
120 See id.
1 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
122 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 104 (listing companies from Italy, Ger-
many, Spain, France, Belgium, and Austria facing potential U.S. sanctions); Ta-
heri, supra note 113 (discussing Iran's ties with Turkey, Germany, and France
as well as a shipbuilding contract with Italy in Bandar Abbas).
123 Recent oil price increases will provide Iran with an additional $1 billion
over the next year. See Taheri, supra note 113; see alsoEnergy: U.S. Legislation to
Have Limited Impact on Iran Oil Sector, Inter Press Service, Dec. 12, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File [hereinafter Oil Sector] (claiming
that Iran is capable of sustaining its present oil production for the next five-to-
ten years).
24 See Oil Sector, supra note 123.
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field. 126 Such a goal requires compliance by other countries with
the policies expressed by these sanctions. Without cooperation,
U.S. firms stand to lose valuable opportunities in an extremely
competitive sector. 127  With respect to ILSA, compliance is not
and likely will not be forthcoming.
The current response to ILSA by the international commu-
nity is a combination of disregard and coalition building. Several
companies from France, Russia, and Malaysia have agreed to a $2
billion development of the South Pars natural gas field with
Iran.12' The deal includes Total SA of France, the Malaysian na-
tional oil corporation, Petronas, and the state-owned Gazprom of
Russia. 129 Because this coalition deal includes state-owned com-
panies and operations from different countries, enforcement of
ILSA becomes extremely precarious. Coalitions provide more
than financing; they presently proffer corporations safety in
numbers. This deal highlights an important element of develop-
ing international commerce: MNCs are not entirely non-state en-
tities. As the South Pars deal indicates, nations have an interest in
ensuring the prosperity of their businesses and are sensitive to en-
croachments on these operations by other countries.
126 However, many U.S. oil companies decry the imposition of sanctions
against Iran. See Maher Chmaytelli, U.S. Oil Firms Left Out, Furstrated as Iran
Opens for Business, Agence France Presse, Mar. 18, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File. Archie Dunham, the President and CEO of
Conoco, declared that the United States must change its"'use of unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions as a foreign-policy tool.'" Id. The failure of U.S. sanctions to
encourage its allies to follow suit has prevented U.S. firms from enjoying the
benefits of recent market expansion in countries like Iran. See id
127 See id "'If Washington does come around to the view that its policy is
not working, and that the domestic developments in Iran would justify a
change of approach, the Europeans will immediately start worrying that U.S.
competitors will outsmart them in the battle for contracts.'" Id. (quoting
Rosemary Hollis, head of the Middle East Programme at London's Royal Insti-
tute of International Affairs).
128 .
See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Clinton Hesitates to Punish Nations for Iran Oil
Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1998, at Al; U.S. Official Not Investigating Petronas-
Iran Deal, ASIAN ECON. NEWs, Nov. 24, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Curnws File. Additionally, Bow Valley Energy Ltd. of Canada and the
Indonesian outfit, Bakrie Minarak have also signed a $180 million agreement
for the development of Iranian energy products. See Erlanger, supra, at Al.
Russia's Gazprom has also initiated talks with Iran for other various energy sec-
tor projects. See Michael S. Lelyveld, Russia's Ongoing Iran Deals Anger Sanc-
tions Backers, J. OF COM., Mar. 23, 1998, at 1lA.
129 See id; Erlanger, supra note 128, at 11.
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These international responses are exacerbated by domestic
politics in the United States. First, the difficulty with ILSA is
that it differs fundamentally from the analogous pipeline em-
bargo 30 with respect to their points of origin. The Sanctions Act
will not be repealed easily: congressional representatives would
probably view revocation of antiterrorist legislation as certain po-
litical suicide. The pipeline embargo conversely was an act of ex-
ecutive discretion easily discontinued.13 ' ILSA does offer some
opportunity for2presidential discretion, which may serve to miti-
gate its effects. 13  Presently, the President is seeking ways to in-
voke the waivers available in ILSA with respect to the South Pars
Deal. 133  The reluctance by President Clinton to enforce ILSA
demonstrates the political underpinnings of the Sanctions Act.
Neither Congress nor the President could politically afford to
block passage of legislation at least superficially intended to com-
bat terrorism. 134 The resulting signals sent to Europe are that the
United States is incapable of producing coherent foreign policy,
135
and, more importantly, that ILSA, because it is effectively being
ignored by the President and his administration, may be ig-
nored.
136
4.3. U.S. Extraterritorial Legislation and the World Trade
Organization: The Future of ILSA Under the WTO Is
Bleak
It appears that ILSA was drafted, at least in part, with the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") in mind. The congressional
findings cited as reasons for adopting ILSA include attempts by
Iran and Libya to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruc-
tion as well as the threat to U.S. national security posed by inter-
national terrorism. 137 Although referencing a legitimate concern
130 See supra Section 2.2.2.2.
131 See Lowenfeld, supra note 5, at 433.
132 See supra Section 3.
133 See, e.g., Erlanger, supra note 128, at 11.
134 See supra note 6.
135 See, e.g., Natm, supra note 49, at 34; Lelyveld, supra note 128, at 1lA
("[T]he right hand of [the U.S.] Iran policy never seems to know what the left
hand is doing.").
136 Europe, Russia, Canada, Indonesia, and Malaysia all seem content to ig-
nore ILSA and its threat of sanctions. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying
text.
137 See H.R. 3107, 104th Cong. S 2 (1996).
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over terrorism, ILSA, if brought before a WTO panel, likely will
not warrant an exemption under the national security escape
clause in Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("Agreement"). 38 Such a defense is tenuous at best and will
not be received well by any WTO panel. Equally important
would be the means by which ILSA seeks to effect its goals. The
Sanctions Act employs a secondary boycott affecting private indi-
viduals and corporations not a party to any alleged threat to U.S.
national security. Article XXI of the Agreement cannot be con-
strued broadly; such an interpretation would render the Agree-
ment and the WTO impotent by seriously undermining their
ability to bind member nations to dispute settlement decisions.
4.4. The Costly Impact of Sanctions Is Diverse and Far-Ranging
The result of offensive extraterritoriality embodied in ILSA is
the actual possibility of increasinh the costs of conducting interna-
tional commercial transactions.' The most common costs asso-
138 Article XXI states in pertinent part:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(b) to prevent any contracting party from takin& any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they
are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war
and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly
or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
.(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international rela-
tions; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursu-
ance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the main-
tenance of international peace and security.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 art. XXI, 61 stat. A-63
(footnote omitted).
139 Forcing companies to navigate a minefield of legislation may delay or
deter international transactions, or, as has happened recently, companies may
engage their host countries to protect their interests, which necessarily delays
projects. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. The failure likely to
result from ILSA has been analogized to the catastrophic U.S. grain embargo of
the Soviet Union, which resulted in no foreign policy gains and a loss of U.S.
share in the Soviet grain market. See Berry, supra note 125, at 14.
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ciated with U.S. economic sanctions as reported in a study by the
European-American Business Council ("Report") include "a loss
of joint venture opportunities, a reduction in U.S. employment,
and severed supply relationships." 140 Further, the Report indi-
cated that 80% of the participating firms were harmed by U.S.
sanctions, 44% lost business opportunities, and eighteen partici-
pating firms reported an aggregate loss of $1.9 billion due to U.S.
economic sanctions. 14 ' Because the United States has to date
failed to enforce ILSA, international transactions operate under a
looming cloud of unpredictability.'42 Both of these effects are un-
friendly to the conduct of international trade and business.
Negative economic impact is only one of the untoward results
of ILSA's extraterritoriality. When unilateral legislation goes un-
heeded in the international community, the goal of curbing rogue
behavior will go unmet. Further, it is likely that the people of a
targeted nation ultimately will bear the burden of economic sanc-
tions.
143
One interesting consequence of ILSA is its impact on the abil-
ity of the President and his administration to implement foreign
policy. First, ILSA makes any attempts by President Clinton to
improve relations with Iran extremely difficult. This is a rather
unfortunate and untimely result with the indication by new Ira-
nian President, Mohammad Khatami, that Iran may be willing to
scale-back confrontation with the United States.'"
Second, the United States needs cooperation from Europe and
Russia to deal with ongoing troubles with Iraq and recent events
in Serbia.'45 Not only is the President impaired by domestic po-
litical agendas, 4 6 he is also confronted with legislation that, al-
though intended to force the hand of U.S. trading partners, ties
his hands in foreign relations while failing to effect any of its
stated goals. 47 It is quite clear that ILSA was drafted without
140 Id.
141 See id.
142 See Snyder, supra note 6 (discussing the lack of clarity within ILSA as to
determinations of legality of transactions which will require a case-by-case
analysis causing delay and expense before a venture even begins).
43 See Berry, supra note 125, at 14.
144 See Erlanger, supra note 128, at Al; Lelyveld, supra note 128, at 1lA.
145 See Erlanger, supra note 128, at Al.
146 See Nalm, supra note 49, at 35 (referring to the "primacy Clinton gives
to [domestic] political calculations").
147 See Erlanger, supra note 128, at Al.
[Vol119:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss1/6
IRANAND LIBYA SANCTIONSACT OF 1996
contemplation of its far-reaching impact, 148 and such legislation
must be curbed in the future.
4.5. A Prospective and Pragmatic Proposal for Solving Problems
of Extraterritorial Legislation
The difficulty with extraterritorial legislation is that, at least
to some extent, it is a symptom rather than an ailment. Efforts to
liberalize world trade and the increasing economic interdepend-
ence of nation-states necessarily lead to such legislative confronta-
tions. A solution to the problem of extraterritoriality is not a
quixotic wind mill campaign. Rather, acceptance of the unique
structure of international law that operates without binding force
should implicate the need for a regime of comity instead of com-
bat, which threatens to undermine a comity regime already in op-
eration by agreement under the GATT-WTO system.
Congress should enact future legislation with consideration of
international concerns as well as domestic ones. The influence of
electoral politics on acts of Congress may not reasonably be ex-
pected to dissipate; it may, however, be restrained. The principle
of reasonableness should govern the imposition and enforcement
of extraterritorial legislation. The Restatement, Third, of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States recommends such practice. Na-
tions have the authority, prescriptive jurisdiction, to make laws
applicable to conduct without its borders having or intending to
have "substantial effect within its territory."149 Prescriptive juris-
diction is impermissible "when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable."' 50 Reasonableness is determined by a host of fac-
148 See Berry, supra note 125, at 14. "Many legislators seem to believe that
voting for sanctions is good politics with little cost .... Even if sanctions have
no effect they still make a statement, say many lawmakers. These views are too
often held without any understanding of the harm caused by sanctions....
Id.
149 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES S 402(1)(c) (1986). This authority is included under"jurisdiction to pre-
scribe," which permits nations "to make its law applicable to the activities, rela-
tions, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by leg-
islation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by
determination of a court." Id. 5 401(a). Complementing prescriptive jurisdic-
tion is "jurisdiction to enforce," which permits enforcement of and punishment
for noncompliance with "laws or regulations" subject to reasonableness re-
quirements under S 403. Id. S 401(c).
150 Id. S 403(1).
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tors; 151 these factors should be considered prospectively when en-
acting legislation.
ILSA fails under several of these factors. First, foreign in-
vestment in development of the energy sectors of the Iranian and
Libyan economy does not have a "substantial, direct, and foresee-
able effect upon" 152 the United States. U.S. regulation of such in-
vestment through a secondary boycott contravenes the "traditions
of the international system." 15 3  Finally, ILSA regulates invest-
ment that other states, chiefly those of the EU, "have an interest
in regulating, " 154 and where the "likelihood of conflict with regu-
lation by another state"1 5 is imminent.
ILSA offers an opportunity to employ comity to create a dip-
lomatic solution to U.S. problems with its trading partners over
extraterritoriality. The President may suspend or withhold en-
forcement of ILSA for particular countries or individuals if such
action conforms with the national interest. 56 The difficulty with
this exercise of presidential discretion has several implications.
First, it injects more unpredictability into an already chaotic sys-
tem. Second, this discretion does not erase the actual legislation,
which itself is objectionable. Finally, the President's failure to en-
force ILSA indicates to other countries that the Sanctions Act
may be disregarded.
Senator Richard Lugar has introduced a bill that will provide
Congress with guidance in drafting sanctions legislation in the fiu-
ture. This prospective cure cannot prevent the damage caused
by ILSA, but it may curb future transgressions by encouraging
principled guidance to drafters and requiring sunset 5provisions in
legislation imposing sanctions on foreign countries.
5. CONCLUSION
The recent commitment of the United States to unilateral im-
position of foreign policy is as much an economic problem as it is
151 See id. § 403(2).
152 Id. S 403(2)(a).
... Id. S 403(2)(0 .
154 RESTATEMENT S 403(2)(g).
156 Id. § 403(2)(h).
156 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.




IRANAND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
a diplomatic one. ILSA probably does not violate any technical
norms of international law (all WTO considerations aside), be-
cause it simply provides foreign entities with a choice between
trade with the U.S. and trade with Iran. However, this simplistic
view of the legislation ignores its potential impact. Its offensive
nature may produce adverse, indirect economic effects in third-
party countries. Further, foreign policy is as interdependent as
world economies have become, and any attempt to impose for-
eign policy on other nations will destabilize recent efforts to lib-
eralize trade.
The United States perforce must tread cautiously when gener-
ating international legislation for two reasons. First, the current
international system requires a certain amount of mutual respect,
comity, to operate because it lacks central authority and control
over nation-states. Second, the United States risks becoming an
economic pariah at both the level of nation-states and the level of
individuals involved in international transactions.
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